We present an empirical model of wealth transfer taxation in the revenue systems of the G7 countries -Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U. K. and the U. S. -over the period from 1965 to 2009. Our model emphasizes the influences of population aging and of the stock of household wealth in an explanation of the past and likely future of this tax source. Simulations with the model using U.N. demographic projections and projections of household wealth suggest that even in France and Germany where reliance on wealth transfer taxation has been increasing for part of the period studied, wealth transfer taxes can be expected to wither away as population aging deepens over the next three decades. Our results indicate that recent tax designs that rely upon the taxation of wealth transfers to preserve equity in the face of declining taxation of capital incomes may be, in this respect, politically infeasible for the foreseeable future. We conclude by using the case of wealth transfer taxation to raise the general question of the extent to which the consistency of a proposed reform with expected political equilibria ought to play a role in the design of a normative policy blueprint.
Introduction
In this paper we present an empirical model of wealth transfer taxation in the G7 countries over the period from 1965 to 2009. 1 We also use the estimated model to forecast the likely role of wealth transfer taxation in the revenue systems of the G7 over the next three decades, and we consider the implications of these simulations for tax design.
Despite its universally low and, in many countries, its diminishing importance in contemporary revenue systems, the taxation of inherited wealth and bequests has assumed new importance in tax design in recent years, for several reasons. First, taxes on income from capital -an indirect form of wealth taxation -have gradually declined since World War II, most likely in response to the increasing international mobility of capital. In the most recent tax design, the factors underlying this development have led to renewed emphasis on taxation of the stock of wealth as a means of preserving vertical equity. The Mirrlees Review of the U.K. tax structure (2011) recommends lighter taxation of capital income, in accordance with its increasing mobility, through exemption of the 'normal' return to investment.
2 As a complement, it also suggests serious consideration be given to a return to higher rate of a tax on inherited wealth and bequests so as to maintain equity in the tax system as a whole.
A second and reinforcing argument for increased reliance on wealth transfer taxation comes from Piketty and Saez's (2012) critique of optimal tax work suggesting that the optimal taxation of wealth is too low. They argue that existing work on inheritance and capital taxation is not 'realistic', in the sense that it places too little emphasis on inequality in inheritances, ignores the fact that interest rates tend to exceed growth rates implying domination of society by rentiers, places too much emphasis on high long run elasticities of saving and capital, and on stability of rates of return. They suggest, in partial contrast to the Mirrlees Review, that there is room in an optimal tax design for both inheritance and capital income taxation. 3 A third reason for renewed interest in the taxation of inherited wealth is simply the increasing skewness in the distribution of income over the last two decades, as indicated for example by time series on top income shares (Atkinson et al., 2011; Atkinson and Piketty, 2010; Scheve and Stavasage, 2012a) and growing inequality in wealth (Piketty, 2014) . Wealth transfer taxation is, or can be, highly progressive, and so would help to reduce inequality in after tax incomes, even if it raises little in the way of revenues. 3 Finally, and to further emphasize the issue of equity in taxation raised above, one may note that the general shift from income to consumption taxation that has been going on over the past three or four decades, has increased the salience in policy discussions of the taxation of inheritances and bequests. This is simply because the part of income not taxed under an annual consumption tax regime will escape taxation completely over a person's lifetime if it is passed on to the next generation. 5 In the first instance, we are interested in understanding empirically why reliance on taxation of wealth transfers has generally been declining despite normative arguments to the contrary, and in making projections of what can be expected to happen in this regard over the next three decades, barring some dramatic change in the nature of electoral politics in these countries. We focus on wealth taxation in the G7 countries from 1965 to 2009 because the approach we take to the modeling of revenue structure requires measurement of the tax base, and good measures of household wealth now exist for these countries over this period.
After providing a selective survey of the literature in the next section that highlights attempts to understand the motivation for bequests and the evolution of wealth transfer taxation in democratic countries, in section three we present a basic theoretical framework that highlights the role of two key factors explaining relative reliance on wealth transfer taxes in an evolving political equilibrium: aging of the population, and the evolution of the stock of household wealth. The first of these two elements is suggested by the review of literature on wealth transfer taxation, and fits easily into the model of tax structure developed in section three of the paper, following the approach outlined by , Kenny and Winer (2006) , Profeta (2007) , Winer et al. (2011) and others. The second element, the size of the relevant tax base, is a standard variable that must always appear in any complete model of a tax system. We begin moving towards empirical implementation of the model in a fourth section where we look carefully at wealth taxation, population and other data for the G7 countries that we are going to consider. In section five we formulate and estimate our empirical model, including here additional explanatory factors underlying inheritance taxation suggested in the literature, such as the degree of social solidarity among other factors. The results of this empirical analysis show clearly that general aging of the population in G7 societies has a strong negative effect on reliance on wealth transfer taxation, while an increase in the stock of household wealth has a positive effect. For the somewhat neglected case of wealth transfer taxation, these results contribute to a growing body of work that aims to uncover the underlying determinants of tax structure.
Finally, we conduct a simulation analysis using the estimated model in order to predict the future of wealth transfer taxes in the G7 countries over the next three decades, and we use these simulations to put forward the challenge to tax design, and to policy design in general, posed by predictions about political equilibria that are out of step with the direction indicated 4 by normative policy arguments. Expanding the set of ideas about what may be socially desirable, which hopefully will influence what governments do, is usually the object of a tax design analysis. However, when the direction of reform suggested by normative ideas is at odds with the expected evolution of equilibrium tax structure, as we shall see is the case concerning wealth transfer taxation, it is reasonable to expect that politicians will end up picking and choosing from the designer's optimized menu of reforms. To the extent that this picking and choosing occurs, the original tax design is no longer relevant in a basic sense. This is an important point. 6 That the taxation of bequests -a part of any well-designed consumption tax that is required to insure equitable treatment of those with and without capital assets -would be left aside is what Charles McLure feared in preparing his well-known broad-based income tax proposal for President Reagan in the early 1980s (see McLure and Zodrow, 2007) . 7 Despite prevailing academic opinion at the time which favored a shift towards consumption taxation, McLure relied on the older Schanz-Haig-Simons tradition of broad based income taxation, rather than propose a consumption tax that would likely be implemented without a key provision concerning the taxation of bequests.
Since demographic aging in the G7 will continue, projections made with our estimated model suggest that any tax reform proposal that places renewed emphasis on the taxation of wealth transfers may not be aligned with general trends in the political economies of these countries, and is at risk in the basic sense described above.
2.
A selective survey of literature concerning wealth transfer taxation in democratic countries
The bequest motive appears to be an important, measurable feature of human behavior (Bernheim, 1991; Kopczuk 2013; and Davies and Shorrocks 2000) . Thus we should expect that inheritances and bequests may be a target for taxation. However, what pattern such taxation will actually take, or even if it will exist at all, are other matters.
In terms of relative reliance on the taxation of inheritances and bequests in total tax revenues, data from Flora (1983) for European countries in the period show that the peak of bequest taxation is reached for most countries by 1910. From 1930 the decline in reliance on 6 The question of whether normative public finance needs political economy has been raised before. See Winer and Shibata (2002) and the debate therein between Boadway and Hettich, and Hettich and Winer (2006) . In broader contexts, arguments for taking political feasibility or consistency with current and expected political equilibria into account in normative policy design have been made over the years by McKee and West (1981) , Dixit (1997) , and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) Recent data for OECD countries collected by Cremer and Pestieau (2006) show that the tendency for inheritance taxation to decline is broadly based. Canada, Australia and New Zealand have even abolished explicit bequest taxes, though there is indirect taxation in Canada via the taxation of capital gains (deemed realized) at death. 9 The declining reliance on inheritance taxes in developed countries since 1945 is also documented in Bertocchi (2011) . Bird (1991) suggests that the abolition of, or the reduction in reliance on, wealth transfer taxes is related to the increased importance of economic growth and economic efficiency arguments in place of equity issues in discussions of tax design. More recently, Arrondel and Masson (2013) emphasize the importance of family values and intergenerational links, when the family is considered as the only truly safe investment and inheritances are seen as a reaction to uncertain social conditions created by globalizing markets and cutbacks in the welfare state. Scheve and Stasavage (2012a) propose an explanation based on an empirical model of top wealth tax rates in a large sample of countries over very long periods of time. Their explanation centers on the need for social solidarity during war.
10 Solidarity is enhanced by the taxation of substantial wealth for two main reasons. Wealthier individuals are less likely to be actively engaged in fighting, thus their sacrifice can be in terms of money (taxes); and wealthier individuals own companies which produce goods, the demand for which increases due to war. They also argue that if taxes are used to repay the debt which was created to finance the war, then this solidarity effect will continue for some time. Their empirical results also suggest that the rise of wealth transfer taxation earlier on was not associated with extension of the franchise.
In a theoretical paper, Bertocchi (2011) argues that the falling reliance on wealth taxes is due to several factors, namely: (i) the historical long run decline of wealth inequality, a common long run trend among developed countries even if their degrees of wealth inequality are very different; (ii) growth and the process of capital accumulation, which contributes to inequality reduction and further accelerates the decline of bequest tax rates; (iii) tax compliance -where compliance is low, as in continental European countries, bequest taxes are lower than in the U.K. and the U.S. where tax compliance is high; and, finally (iv) political institutions, especially enfranchisement which, it is predicted, is positively related to reliance on bequest tax revenue. 8 On the structural problems of estate and gift taxes in the U.S. see Pechman (2005) . 9 In Canada, federal wealth transfer taxes were abolished in 1972, and deemed realization at death began as part of a new capital gains tax regime. Unfortunately there is no data on revenues from the deemed realization at death component of capital gains taxation. See Duff (2005) for more details on the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 10 Scheve and Stasavage (2010) focus on the more general relationship between mass warfare and redistributive public policies through progressive taxation.
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Bertocchi's model suggests that wealth tax revenue started growing with a wave of electoral reforms that significantly expanded the voting franchise in presence of high degrees of wealth inequality, while wealth tax reductions after 1910 can be explained by the decline of wealth income inequality and the simultaneous process of industrialization.
11 This argument concerning the role of the franchise is at odds with the empirical results reported by Scheve and Stasavage (2012a) .
There is some work on the evolution of the taxation of wealth transfers that emphasizes the role of age structure. Koka (2011) argues that younger populations want to tax capital more, and older ones less, because the income of young agents is especially generated from labor and because government transfers increase with age. In contrast, Mateos-Planas (2010) finds that this age effect can be dominated by a general equilibrium effect: in a younger society the return to capital and the saving rate will be higher, and (he argues) this may lead to lighter taxation of capital.
If we look at the literature on the bequest motives of individual taxpayers, with the idea that these motives will translate into voting behavior, we find more ideas that point to the importance of age structure. Kopczuk (2007) estimates that about 75 percent of a representative sample of elderly single households has a desire to leave an estate with positive net worth. Much of estate planning appears to happen following the onset of terminal illness, suggesting the desire for holding on to wealth prior to the time when death becomes inevitable. Thus he suggests that people do estate planning later in life, and hence presumably worry only then about taxation of their accumulated wealth. In other words, the old are, or become, more single minded about leaving bequests, which leads to the conclusion that we should expect growing resistance to wealth transfer taxes as the population generally ages. Moreover, we can add, if parents resist more as they age, so may the growing number of their adult children who stand to benefit.
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Focusing on attitudes to inheritances in Britain, Rowlingson and McKay (2005) find that these attitudes show important differences by age group. People in their fifties and sixties appear to be most interested in enjoying life and they do not worry about bequests. In contrast, people in their eighties appear to be more careful with their money and say they wish to leave bequests.
In a recent comprehensive survey of work on the taxation of intergenerational transfers, Kopczuk (2013) argues that the literature as a whole has failed to identify the single motive for bequests. There is, it appears, a great deal of heterogeneity. From the perspective of an inquiry into how motives may translate into political action, it is of interest to note that he concludes that control over wealth is important to the wealthy, and this may explain why estate planning, which can in principle be used to drastically reduce tax obligations, but which typically requires 7 giving up control, is not used to a greater extent. This is another reason why wealthy, older citizens may oppose wealth transfer taxation even though carefully planning would allow them to more or less avoid it.
3.
A conceptual framework for understanding the roles of aging and wealth in the evolution of wealth transfer taxation
In this section we introduce a framework that allows us to think of wealth transfer taxation as one component of a tax structure that emerges as part of a competitive political equilibrium, following, among the others, , Kenny and Winer (2006) , Profeta (2007) , Winer et al. (2011) , Galli and Profeta (2009) . The model is designed to highlight the roles of aging and the stock of household wealth, as a prelude to including these factors into an empirical model explaining relative reliance on wealth transfer taxation in the G7 countries.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the expenditure side of the budget consists of one pure public good. We also ignore interdependencies of tax and expediture instruments other than via the government budget constraint. We do not lose much by doing so: in modern fiscal systems, the raising of taxes and the spending of tax revenues are, more or less, decided upon in separate budgetary processes, at least because it is difficult to link payments by an individual citizen to the services that he or she receives.
Consider two political parties: an incumbent government and its opposition, facing an electorate consisting of taxpayers of differing ages. Before the election takes place, the parties commit to a policy platform , which is defined by a vector , where defines all aspects of a specific tax in the fiscal system, including its base, rate and associated special provisions such as exemptions and deductions. The vector of taxes is defined so as to contain non-negative elements. However, particular tax instruments (such as a wealth transfer tax) may not be used, and in that case their value in the vector will be zero. As noted earlier, taxes finance the provision of a single public good .
The choice of a fiscal policy platform by any party is subject to the same government budget constraint, G = R(t) -C(t) , where R(t) indicates the total revenue from all fiscal sources and C(t) is the total costs of administering the fiscal system. Each party chooses the platform which continually optimizes its expected number of votes in the next election . To specify this objective, we shall assume that there are just two groups of citizens-taxpayers of relatively homogeneous members: the old and the young, , and let and indicate the number of old and young individuals respectively. Each group is characterized by a given probability of voting for the incumbent party, and by an indirect utility function , which influences its specific vote sensitivity : and .
Following Coughlin (1992) and and others, the total expected vote for
the incumbent can be written as
, and the expected vote for the opposition as + -.
Old and young obtain utility from the public good and disutility from taxes. In the present context, following Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) , Profeta (2002) and others since, it is appropriate to also assume that tax structure has different impacts on the utility of the two groups of individuals, with the old being (relatively) single-minded with respect to taxes on wealth transfers. That is, to assume that older taxpayers are particularly averse to taxation of their planned wealth transfers. We shall see, not surprisingly, that single-mindedness with respect to wealth transfer taxation leads to reduced reliance upon this type of tax in equilibrium. This effect will be reinforced as the number of single-minded taxpayers grows with population aging.
We recall the evidence suggesting that people delay planning for bequests until late in the lifecycle (Kopczuk, 2007 and 2013) . This provides one motivation for introducing singlemindedness of older taxpayers concerning inheritance taxation. A further reason is that the elderly need to be assisted by their adult children (see for example Cremer and Pestieau, 2006, among others) , an effect that is likely reinforced when longevity increases. In this well-known story, the elderly want to give their children more wealth by reducing taxes on wealth transfers, in order to obtain the maximum support from their adult children. The young, in contrast, can be assumed to incur disutility from all taxes because their interests are more dispersed among their activities, i.e. they are a less cohesive group in terms of their interests.
To encapsulate single-mindedness in our model in a simple manner, we may specify indirect utilities of each age group as follows: with , and for any w i  , and for any .
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Characterizing the equilibrium fiscal system in the framework we have outlined can be conveniently accomplished by using the Representation Theorem for such spatial voting models (see Coughlin, 1992 and Hettich and Winer, 1999, chp 4, for details) . This is a well-used mathematical method of replicating the Nash electoral equilibrium by solving an optimization problem, rather than by solving the usual simultaneous set of first order conditions for the choice of fiscal instruments that maximizes expected votes of each political party.
We proceed by stating the following problem of optimizing a synthetic political support function *, the solution to which characterizes the electoral equilibrium:
13 All we really need is that wealth transfer taxation be relatively more important to the old than to the young. The assumption of the partial derivative being zero for the old allows this idea to be incorporated without much loss of generality.
The basic idea behind this representation theorem is that failures to optimize political support defined across the electorate will allow opposition parties to propose a platform that promises to make some voters better off without making others worse off, thus increasing its overall electoral support. Competition insures that in an electoral equilibrium, no such opportunities effectively remain to be taken up.
14 Formally speaking, the theorem works because the first order conditions for the problem in (1) are, by design, identical in general form to those each party must solve when choosing an optimal political platform.
In the problem specified in (1), a star represents a quantity which is evaluated in a Nash electoral equilibrium. In particular, s h * represents the weight effectively placed on group h's welfare in the Nash electoral equilibrium. These influence weights are numbers that form part of the specification of the actual Nash equilibrium solution, and which we are using to formulate the synthetic support function. These weights encapsulate or reflect inequalities in political influence that emerge in the equilibrium. The support function, therefore, is not a social welfare function, since the weights on indirect utilities in it are not based on any normative principle about social welfare of the usual kind.
The first order conditions corresponding to the problem in (1) are: (2) where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constaint. These conditions indicate that, in the equilibrium, taxes are adjusted by any government or opposing political party until the marginal effect on political support per dollar of revenue (net of administration costs) is equalized across all fiscal instruments in use.
Note that this politically optimal platform is one in which some fiscal instrument may not actually be used. For example, if the marginal political cost per dollar of revenue associated 14 The equilibrium choice of policies is Pareto efficient in this formulation. It is possible to introduce inefficiency into the equilibrium, following Hettich and Winer (1999, chp 6 ) and others. But we do not do so here. Unless we can add into the estimating equation such factors as misleading political advertising that underlie electoral inefficiency, data which we do not have, such an analysis does not lead to a different estimating equation.
with a small increase in t i is greater than the marginal political benefit of another dollar of public services, the corresponding tax source will not be used in the electoral equilibrium.
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Now consider an equilibrium fiscal system of the type described above, but with just two tax instruments: a tax on wealth transfers (t w ) which we are interested in modelling empirically, and a tax (t i ) applied to some generic base i. The first order conditions (2) imply that: (3) Equation (3) characterizes in a general manner the equilibrium levels of taxes on wealth transfers and on the generic base. It is designed to highlight two effects which have opposing consequences for reliance on wealth transfer taxation, and which will play key roles in the empirical work presented in the following section of the paper:
(i) the demographic effect: when older voters are more numerous, reliance on the wealth transfer tax decreases. Because of single-mindedness of the elderly, the disutility from the wealth tax depends on the number of elderly, while the disutility from the alternative does not. Thus, as n o increases, only the disutility from the wealth tax gets bigger. This raises the numerator on left side of (3) for given revenue from each tax source. In the new equilibrium (after population aging), wealth transfer tax revenue will decrease relative to total revenue in the electoral equilibrium.
(ii) the base effect: when household wealth increases, reliance on the wealth tax increases. When household wealth becomes greater, given the base of the alternative tax, the numerator on the left side declines because the marginal excess burden of the tax does at given tax rates. Marginal political opposition to a tax may also be reduced, given fixed costs of political action, as the existing tax is spread over a larger domain of economic activity. Also, marginal net revenue from increasing the tax rate on this growing base may become larger. The left side of (3) is consequently reduced, and competition then leads every party to increase reliance on the wealth tax.
The simple model we have outlined has several limitations, some of which we can allow for in our empirical implementation that follows in section five. First, we have only considered a partition of the electorate into young and old voters. Adding in children, of the old and of the young, will generate an additional reason for reduced reliance on wealth transfer taxation at each point in time as the children of the older generation increase in relative size with 15 We shall see in the simulations presented later that some wealth transfer taxes may disappear as they become politically useless relative to other policy instruments. Second, we did not include a distribution of wealth in the model. Adding this feature would greatly complicate it. Considering old and young taxpayers with and without large stocks of wealth would allow for the effect suggested by Alvaredo et al. (2013) , namely that the less wealthy want more wealth taxation as inheritances become more important in wealth transmission.
Looking ahead to empirical implementation of the model, we note that it is reasonable to expect that the effect of the growing number of older children who will be recipients of inheritances can be captured by a variable representing the aging of the population, which will be included in the estimating equation. Regarding the possibly growing importance of wealth transfers in wealth transmission and the consequences of this for the electoral equilibrium, we can include in the equation the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate (r-g), which is a positive indicator of the role of inherited wealth in a society (Piketty and Saez, 2012; Piketty, 2014) . 
Descriptive trends for the G7 countries
Before we turn to estimation of the empirical model that incorporates the ideas highlighted by the framework outlined above, it is useful to take a close look at the data using descriptive methods.
The role of wealth transfer taxation -that is, the taxation of estates, inherited wealth and bequests -has been declining in many, though not all countries in the developed world since the end of World War II, though our data used in empirical work and shown in the following figures dates from 1965. Figures 1a to 1i , for the G7 countries -respectively, Canada, Italy, the U.K., the U.S., France, Germany and Japan -illustrate the post-1965 decline in wealth transfer taxation in the first four of these countries. They also show the rise in the importance of such taxation in France and Germany, and its rising and falling pattern in Japan.
[FIGURES 1a-1i]
We shall argue the process of population aging (the demographic effect) and the evolution of the stock of household wealth (via the base effect) are importantly involved, exercising opposite effects on the extent of reliance on wealth transfer taxes in the G7 countries.
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The evolution of both household wealth over time and of population aging in G7 countries are illustrated in Figures 2a to 2g .
[ In Canada, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S. the reduction of wealth transfer taxes goes hand in hand with both the increase in the share of people aged 65 and above (in total population) and the rise of household wealth. On the contrary, notwithstanding the aging process and the growth of household wealth, in France and Germany wealth transfer taxes show an increasing trend over the 1965 -2009 period. Finally, in Japan the rising and falling pattern of wealth transfer tax revenue appears to mirror a similar pattern in household wealth, while increasing taxation up to the 1990s is positively correlated with an aging process to that point.
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To sum up the content of these figures, we may say at first glance that in some countries (i.e. Canada, Italy, the U.K., the U.S. and Japan until the early 1990s) a negative demographic effect may dominate a positive base effect in explaining reliance on wealth transfer taxation. In other countries however (i.e. France, Germany and Japan after the mid-1990s), the demographic effect may be offset by the base effect.
It is also useful to consider the correlations by country of top inheritance tax rates (from Scheve and Stavasage 2012b) with wealth tax revenue relative to GDP or total tax revenue. These correlations are given in Table 1 . Setting aside those for Canada which are biased by the absence of data on the deemed realization at death part of capital gains taxation which, it may be argued, is a partial substitute for federal death duties that were abolished in 1972, it appears that top tax rates are only somewhat related to wealth tax revenues, especially in Germany and Japan. This suggests that top rates, which few taxpayers will actually pay, may at least partly reflect expressions of social objectives rather than, or in addition to, hard-nosed revenue raising objectives.
[ Table 1 ] Finally, Table 2 provides a snapshot of the corresponding wealth transfer tax structures in the G7 countries. It illustrates the variety and complexity of wealth transfer tax structures, all of which include the specification of a base, a rate structure on that base and numerous and complicated special provisions -what refer to as the tax skeleton. When thinking about how to implement an empirical model, it is important to note, as Table 2 illustrates well, that taxation of inheritances and bequests is not only, or even mostly, about the specification of a standard nominal tax rate.
[ Table 2] 17 Aging in Japan as in the other countries continues throughout the sample period.
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5.
An empirical model explaining relative reliance on wealth transfer taxation in the G7 countries, 1965 -2009
In this section we develop an empirical understanding of the factors driving the evolution of reliance on wealth taxation, with the roles of demography and the wealth transfer tax base receiving special attention. Unlike the interesting work of Scheve and Stavasage (2012a) , the analysis we develop here deals with the post -World War II era in highly developed G7 countries, over a period from 1965 to 2009 when the franchise is more or less fully extended and so does not play a role. The choice of G7 countries stems from the need to measure the stock of household wealth, which we use as a proxy for the size of the wealth transfer tax base, a key requirement for the empirical framework we rely upon.
We recall from the figures discussed in the previous section that the G7 after 1965 includes countries where reliance on wealth transfer taxation has been decreasing steadily, as well as countries in which it has been increasing or fluctuating, so there is considerable action in this cross-country variation to be explained. The sample period is also characterized by both a substantial increase in the mobility of capital, making it increasingly easier, in principle at least, to avoid taxation of inheritances and bequests, and by demographic aging in all of the G7 countries which, however, differs across countries in its precise profile.
The specification of the empirical model follows , Kenny and Winer (2006) , Profeta and Scabrosetti (2010) and Winer et al. (2011) . In this view, embodied in the framework presented in section three, reliance on wealth transfer taxation is just one part of the fiscal system which emerges along with other aspects of policy choices in the political equilibrium of each country in the sample. Although we estimate only one equation explaining the role of wealth transfer taxation in the tax system, the equation should be thought of as one part of a reduced form that encompasses a full set of equilibrium fiscal policy choices. The equation must be specified accordingly.
The dependent variable in our regressions is alternatively, wealth transfer taxation (of estates, inheritances and gifts or bequests) relative to GDP; wealth transfer taxation as share of total tax revenue; wealth transfer taxation relative to GDP averaged over five year intervals (to remove macroeconomic fluctuations); and nominal top inheritance tax rates from the data set supplied by Scheve and Stavasage (2012b) . We note that in view of the complexity of the wealth transfer tax skeleton (see again Table 1 ), the use of a nominal tax rate alone is not more desirable as a dependent variable than a revenue based measure. Nominal rates do not reflect the complexity of modern taxation including its administration, and do not capture adequately movements in effective rates of tax on any base due to changing deductions and exemptions, or developments in the definition of the standard base itself.
14 In line with the implementation of this political equilibrium perspective, our explanatory variables fall into one of the following five categories:
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 variables directly related to inheritance taxation: This includes household net wealth, which is a proxy for the tax base; the population share of people aged 65 and above, which is a proxy for resistance to wealth transfer taxation by parents and their adult children; an 'erosion of solidarity index' after World War II, as suggested by Scheve and Stasavage (2012a); 19 and the proportion of the labor force in agriculture since it is particularly hard to tax the wealth of farmers. As suggested by Bertocchi (2011) this last variable may also be considered to be a (perhaps somewhat rough) proxy for the process of capital accumulation which alters inequality in wealth;
 variables appearing because inheritance taxation is one tax in a fiscal system: Here we include factors affecting the size of other tax bases, as in Kenny and Winer (2006) . They are real GDP per head (the base for personal income tax); the log of population density (related directly to property taxation as an alternative source); natural resources (i.e. the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents as a percentage of GDP), again as an alternative tax source; and the ratio of public expenditure over GDP, as a measure of the scale of government size which, argue, may affect the (possibly non-linear in size) political costs of relying on any particular tax;
 variables related to other policy instruments, of which taxation is only one type in the full general equilibrium policy system: This category includes trade union density, reflecting the use of regulations and labor market policies instead of taxation to redistribute; 20  variables which allow us to take into account the fact that each country has to make policy choices in an international context in which capital incomes are becoming more mobile: Here we include the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP as a measure of openness of the economy; or, alternatively, the KOF globalization index and/or net foreign direct investment outflows over GDP; Tan (2011) . 21 The international openness variable can be also considered to be a proxy for the degree of international tax competition.
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ideological position of the political party in office, which we assume is related to attempts at redistribution, with left parties more likely to adopt more progressive features in the tax system.
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The general form of the basic estimating equation used is:
Y it = α i + β t + γ household_wealth it-2 + δ population_over65 it-2 + controls it-2 + ε it (4) where Y it is the share of wealth transfer taxes over GDP in country i in year t (or another measure of wealth transfer taxation as outlined above) , α i is a country fixed effect and β t is a year fixed effect.
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It seems reasonable to use two-period lags for the explanatory variables we include as regressors in our specifications, since tax revenue are typically reported with a lag of a year and the effects of the independent variables on revenue are likely not immediate. Since the error term might be serially correlated within countries (even after controlling for country fixed effects) and thus wrongly inflate the precision of our estimates, for all specifications we cluster the standard errors at the country level (see Bertrand et al., 2004) .
To limit omitted variables bias, we estimate regressions with country and time fixed effects.
We are aware of the reverse causality problem concerning household wealth and the taxation of wealth transfers. This problem is not directly addressed here as we do not have an instrumental variables strategy to deal with the issue. The issue of endogeneity of wealth and its correlation with the other regressors is a difficult problem, 24 common to several studies focused on the determinants of tax design (see Profeta et al., 2013) .
To deal with possible endogeneity of wealth and other explanatory variables, and confirm the consistency of our estimates, we rely on the following tests. We start by checking stationarity of our variables, to exclude the case of spurious regressions, which arises when both the dependent and the explanatory variable(s) are non-stationary. We perform the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root tests and find that our dependent variable is stationary, while our independent variables of interest are non-stationary (integrated of order one I(1)). The case of a stationary dependent variable being explained by non-stationary regressors is discussed by Pagan and Wickens (1989) and Baffes (1997) . Following Pagan and Wickens (1989) and Baffes (1997) we test whether the regression residuals and the predicted values of the regression model are both 22 In particular we are controlling for the left (right) cabinet portfolios as percentage of all cabinet portfolios, left (right) government party seats as percentage of all legislative seats, left (right) party legislative seats as percentage of all legislative seats and finally left (right) party votes as percentage of total votes. 23 Of course household wealth is accumulated over years, but unfortunately we are not able to identify the underlying process of accumulation. It could be interesting to perform a dynamic analysis of wealth transfer tax revenues related to the accumulation process of household wealth. We will leave this to future research. 24 The use of lagged variables may provide a modest solution to the endogeneity issue, but we cannot of course provide a test of this possibility. 16 stationary. We find that both regression residuals and predicted values of the dependent variable are stationary, indicating that our model is performing in a satisfactory manner.
In any event, the results indicate clear cut patterns which are interpretable in terms of our theoretical framework and which are robust to several alternative specifications of the basic model.
Basic estimation results
Our baseline results using as dependent variable wealth transfer taxation relative to GDP are shown in Tables 3a-c , where in each column we stack the regression output by enlarging the set of control variables step by step. In assessing these results, one should keep in mind the varied history of wealth transfer taxation in the sample we are exploring, where actual reliance on this form of taxation is not universally or uniformly declining over time.
[ Tables 3a-c] The estimation results in these tables show that household net wealth is significantly and positively correlated with wealth transfer taxes as a percent of GDP. Moreover, the share of people aged 65 and above is significantly and negatively correlated with inheritance taxation as a percent of GDP. These are the only statistically significant variables in all the equations. The solidarity index has its expected positive effect on inheritance taxation, but it is not always significant. The same is true for the role of the variable representing income tax base. Population density is negatively and significantly correlated with wealth transfer tax revenue, suggesting reduced reliance on wealth transfer taxes as the property tax base grows, but only when we control for the ideological position of the political party in office. Finally, the openness of the economy, especially when measured by the KOF globalization index, has a positive effect on reliance on wealth transfer taxation. These results hint at the possibility that inheritance taxation is, to some extent, a substitute for reduced reliance on capital income taxation which has been declining in the G7 countries in this period.
Robustness
We have performed several robustness checks of our results. These checks can be briefly summarized as follows:
1) The analysis above was replicated using as a dependent variable the share of wealth transfer taxes relative to total tax revenue (see Table 4 ). Results concerning the role of household net wealth, and the share of people aged 65 and above are confirmed;
[ Table 4]   17 2) To allow for macroeconomic fluctuations, we defined our variables as averages over 5 year intervals (see Table 5 ). Again, results concerning the roles of household net wealth and the share of the population aged 65 and above remain essentially the same;
[ Table 5] (3) Finally we use as the dependent variable the Scheve and Stasavage (2012b) top inheritance tax rate. 25 Both household net wealth and the share of people aged 65 then have their expected, respectively positive and negative signs (as in previous tables), but are not statistically significant. The erosion of the solidarity index, which is declining as World War II becomes more distant, leads to less wealth transfer taxation, but it is statistically significant only in the first two specifications. Also, in equations explaining top rates, real GDP has its expected negative effect, suggesting reduced reliance on top wealth transfer tax rates as the income tax base grows, but it is statistically significant. The difference in results from equations that use top rates and those using shares in GDP or in total revenue may be due to the symbolic aspect of the choice of top rates, as we suggested earlier. It may also be due to the failure of top rates, which few people actually pay, to reflect other important aspects of the tax skeleton.
[ Table 6 ]
Aging and wealth transfer taxation: some simulations
To complete the empirical analysis, in this section we simulate the changes in wealth transfer taxes that may be expected to accompany future developments in demographic structure and with respect to stocks of household wealth. The aging of population can be expected to contribute to a decline in reliance on wealth transfer taxes. However, if the upward trend in household wealth which we have observed over the last decades continues, the effect of aging may be, at least in part, offset. The simulation exercise incorporates projections of aging and of household wealth accumulation. It is based on use of the results provided in Table 3a , column 7. 26 Our predictions are relevant not only to understand base vs demographic effects, but also to get a sense about the political feasibility of using wealth taxes to preserve equity.
We start with simulations related only to aging of populations in the G7 countries. Projections of expected aging of population in the future are available from several international sources. In our simulation exercise we use U.N. projections of the percent of populations over 65 for each country for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030, keeping other variables at their 2009 values. We then compute a predicted value of wealth transfer tax revenue (relative to GDP), and if a predicted value turns out to be negative in any forecast, the predicted figure is replaced with a 25 Top inheritance tax rates are defined as follows: the top rate applied to a single descendant who receives an inheritance in cash. In this case, due to data availability, the time period investigated is from 1960 to 2000. 26 We note that the general nature of the results reported below continue to hold when other specifications from Table 3a are employed.   18 zero. The predictions, and their 95% confidence intervals, are reported in column 1 (demographic effect) of Table 7 . Generally speaking, the predicted levels indicate that wealth transfer taxes will decline to zero -i.e. they will disappear-in most countries, with the exception of Japan and the U.K., where however they show a strong declining trend. In Germany and in Italy, wealth taxes will go to zero by 2022, while in the U.S. wealth taxes are predicted to disappear by 2017. 27 The upper bounds of the confidence intervals show some increase in the predicted levels (relative to the 2009 levels). However, the predicted lower bound here is actually negative, representing a pressure for movement away from the 2009 level to other tax sources. 28 We then include the role of changes in the household net wealth in our simulation exercise. To predict the value of household net wealth in the future is a complicated task. We take the following approach to build household net wealth values for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 . By regressing the stock of household wealth on lagged household wealth we obtain a coefficient which we then use to predict the change in household wealth into the next years.
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These predicted values of household wealth, together with the U.N. estimated values of the share of the elderly in the population, are thus used to predict wealth transfer taxes over GDP, with other independent variables held at their 2009 values. Predictions of reliance on wealth transfer taxation are again made, this time as a result of expected developments in both aging and household net wealth. The results are shown in column 2 (demographic and base effects) of Table 7 . Even in this case, negative predicted values and confidence bounds are replaced with zero.
[ Table 7] The pronounced declining trend in reliance on wealth taxation which we observed in column 1 of Table 7 is again confirmed. However, as expected, these figures show a somewhat slower decline in reliance on wealth transfer taxation in the future due to the fact that larger stocks of wealth lead to increased emphasis on wealth transfers as a tax base.
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To sum up, as zero is the conditional mean predicted value for all countries (which minimizes the mean squared error of the forecast), our best prediction is disappearance of the wealth transfer taxes. Lower and upper bounds add some uncertainty about the predicted value: 27 Due to the absence of data in deemed realization at death which replaced death duties in 1972, we are not considering Canada in our predictions. 28 This is not reflected in Table 7 which truncates the predicted values at zero. 29 Alternatively, we predict household net wealth by assuming annual wealth growth rates in the interval [ -3%;+3%]. Results, available upon request, confirm the declining trend in reliance on wealth transfer taxation. In particular, predicted values of wealth transfer taxes when we assume an annual household wealth growth rate of +3% are very similar to those in column 2 of Table 7 , while when we assume negative annual household wealth growth rates the declining reliance on wealth transfer taxes is obviously even more pronounced. 30 Looking at Japan, when we consider both the demographic and the base effect we find that the demographic effect will prevail from 2017 to 2022 (i.e. we observe a reduction of wealth transfer taxes), but then the base effect will mildly prevail (i.e. we observe a small increase in wealth taxes)even if the predicted values for 2027 and 2032 are lower than the 2009 level.
according to the upper bound, a positive level of wealth transfer taxes may still be an option in the future. However, the predicted lower bound is actually negative, representing a pressure for movement away from the 2009 level to other tax sources. On balance, our results suggest that an increase of a substantial amount of wealth transfer taxes is likely to be unfeasible and thus these taxes are not likely to be a good as a way of preserving equity in the tax system. In view of our main predictions, worldwide capital income taxation (even if international cooperation is only partial) may be just as feasible as route.
Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the factors underlying reliance on the taxation of inherited wealth in the G7 countries over the 1965 to 2009 period that we have developed emphasizes the role of population aging and of the level of household wealth. The role of wealth transfer taxation is negatively and almost always significantly related to an aging electorate, represented in our empirical model by the percent of the population over 65. The coefficient on aging is robustly estimated, even when other factors, suggested by the literature as being potentially important for the evolution of wealth transfer taxation, and of tax structure generally, are included in the empirical model. Our results show that household wealth and the aging of population have a crucial impact on wealth transfer taxes. Household wealth is related to the level of the tax base (and thus to the share of revenue of taxes levied on that base), while the demographic change is related to individuals' (voters') preferences. Thus our empirical analysis is able to take into account both the base effect and political motives behind the wealth transfer taxes. Simulations based on projections of population aging over the next two or three decades, which to the best of our ability allow for the offsetting role of projected future increases in household wealth, indicate that reliance on taxation of wealth transfer taxes in the G7 countries will decline drastically and then will disappear. This is so, we predict, even in countries such as France and Germany where wealth taxation has gradually assumed a more important role since 1965.
Our estimated models and simulations suggest that recent tax designs, such as that of the Mirrlees Review, which rely upon the taxation of wealth transfers to preserve or enhance equity as taxation of capital incomes is further reduced are not, in this particular respect, realistic or politically feasible. In our view, alternative means of preserving or enhancing equity of the fiscal system as the indirect taxation of wealth, via the taxation of capital incomes, is reduced will be required.
We leave the reader with the following questions, which we think that the analysis here brings forward. Should we expect the predicted withering away of wealth transfer taxation to motivate changes in tax design in the face of the declining importance of the taxation of capital income? More generally, should considerations of political feasibility play a role in the drawing up of tax blueprints and, if so, how and to what extent? 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 year people over65 household wealth Results do not change if we also control for labor force in agriculture and the ideological position of the political parties. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% Results do not change if we also control for the labor force in agriculture and the ideological position of the political parties. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% Results do not change if we also control for the labor force in agriculture and the ideological position of the political parties. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% Table 7 Simulations of the decline in reliance on wealth transfer taxation, G7 countries, 2017-2032
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